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In recent years, the Navy has become increasingly
aware of its inability to retain sufficient high calibre
personnel on active duty. In an effort to improve in the
retention of officers and enlisted personnel, the Navy has,
within the past -ten years concentrated on a vigorous and
comprehensive retention program. However, at a time when
instant operational readiness is vital to fulfillment of
our global security requirements, and the complexity of
modern weapons and equipment has placed increased emphasis
on technological competence, the program to retain the right
kinds of trained personnel on active duty in the Navy has
produced little in the way of tangible results*; in fact,
re-enlistment rates have dropped 30 percent since 1962.
Decreasing retention rates have caused great concern
in the Department of the Navy. Personnel retention has
attracted considerable high level attention and, as a result,
"Re-up Rates Down 30 Percent Despite 40 Percent Pay
Boost," Navy Times , Dec. 11, 1968, p. 1.

several detailed studies have been in this area in recent
years. One of the mast recent comprehensive studies, the
"Alford Study," found that the Navy does indeed have a
shortage of career personnel and that this shortage is
affecting the capability of the fleet. The problem is not
simply a shortage that can be expressed as one overall num-
ber; it is a quality shortage and a quantity shortage that
2
varies according to job and skill requirements.
This study, like most of the others, found that the
cause of these qualitative and quantitative shortages is an
3ineffective retention program. The Navy simply is not\
motivating sufficient numbers and the right kinds of personnel
to choose Navy careers.
Why is the present retention program so ineffective?
This thesis is based on the premise that money is a prime
factor for a naval officer or enlisted man in deciding whether
or not to embark on and continue in a naval career. There
is probably no part of the military system that is as old and
U.S., Department of the Navy, Office of the Secretary
of the Navy, Report of the Secretary of the Navy's Task Force
on Navy/Marine Corps Personnel Retention , Vol. I, Ch. 1




still as badly handled as the system for pay in the Armed
Forces. The issues and arguments are as old as the country
itself, the concepts as changing as the environment in which
we live.
Military pay adjustments were ignored from 1958 until
1
1963 while the cost of living increased by 5.7 percent.
Since 1963 , the Armed Forces have received a pay raise each
year. Regular compensation has increased by 40 percent since
1963, yet, retention has not improved; in fact, it has de-
2
clined. It seems that simple across-the-board pay raises
are not the answer. The retention program itself needs to
be modernized, and military pay is a vital part of the program
The Congress recognized the problem when it required
that the President, by not later than January 1, 1967,
"
. . . direct a complete review of the principles and concepts
of the compensation system for members of the uniformed
services ..."
U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United States--1968 (89th ed.;
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 341.
2
"Re-up Rates Down 30 Percent," Navy Times
, p. 1.
3
U.S., Congress, Public Law 87-649, Title 37--Pay and
Allowances of the Uniformed Services, sec. 1008(b).

The President is also required, on completion of the
review to " . . . submit a detailed report to Congress sum-
marizing the results of such review together with any recom-
mendations he may have proposing changes in the statutory
salary system and other elements of the compensation structure
provided members of the armed services."
The President directed the Secretary of Defense to
conduct the review and he, in turn, formed the Military Com-
pensation Policy Board. The Policy Board is chaired by the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) and includes as its
members the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the
Under Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Military
Personnel Chiefs of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps,
the Deputy Under Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force,
the Special Assistant to the Director, Bureau of the Budget,
and the Director, Compensation and Career Development Branch
of the Department of Defense (Rear Admiral Lester E. Hubbell,
U.S.N.).
The working arm of the Policy Board ±^ the Compensation
Study Staff directed by Rear Admiral Hubbell. This staff
commenced operations in March 1966 with the objectives of
analyzing and studying all aspects of military compensation
^bid.

and recommending improvements to the Secretary of Defense that:
provide fairness and equity to the military individual,
the Government, and the taxpayer; and
should assist in attracting, retaining and motivating
into the career force the kinds and numbers of personnel
the uniformed services need.
The result has been a recommendation that Congress
enact a revolutionary new compensation system which is based
on an annual salary system which will replace the existing
t
basic pay and allowances system. The Policy Board believes'
that this system, if approved by Congress, will have a sig-
nificantly beneficial effect on the entire military manpower
2position of the Department of Defense. The system has been
unofficially named "The Hubbell Plan" in recognition of its
architect, Rear Admiral Lester E. Hubbell, U.S.N.
Purpose and Research Questions
The purpose of this paper is to answer the question:
Would implementation of the Hubbell Plan contribute to a more
effective and efficient personnel program in the Navy? In ar-
riving at an answer, it is necessary to consider the following
U.S., Department of Defense, Report of the First
Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, Modernizing
Military Pay , Vol. I, Active Duty Compensation (Washington, D.C.:




1. What specifically is the ITavy's retention problem?
2. Is military pay a retention issue?
3. Why is pay a retention issue?
4. How would the Hubbell proposals correct the
deficiencies in the existing system?
5. Do the proposals recommend a pay increase or would
take home pay remain the same?
6. Would the improved pay system facilitate a more
selective retention program?
7. Are there any limitations in what improved pay can
do for retention?
Scope and Organization of the Study
There are literally hundreds of issues concerning
military pay that are worthy of study. However, this paper is
limited to issues considered, by the author, to be relevant to
personnel retention in the Navy.
Chapter I establishes the need for a new compensation
system by showing the relationship between military pay and
personnel retention. In addition, the chapter contains an
overview of the existing compensation system and its inade-
quacies
Chapter II examines the retention features of the
Hubbell proposals for modernizing military pay. The discussion
in the chapter concerns structural changes in the compensation
system.

Chapter III contains a dollar comparison of the pay
that would be provided under the present pay system on July 1,
1969 and pay that would be provided should Congress approve
the Hubbell Plan.
Chapter IV evaluates the Hubbell Plan as a solution
for the Navy's retention problem. The problem is clarified
and the probable benefits and limitations are discussed.
Chapter "V contains the summary and the author's con-
clusions as a result of this study <>V£
The research for this paper was primarily conducted in
the Department of Defense, the Bureau of Naval Personnel and
the Naval 'Supply Systems Headquarters here in Washington, D.C.
The sources used were almost entirely official government
documents and interviews with Department of Defense personnel;
however, the opinions and conclusions expressed in this paper,





THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE ACTIVE DUTY COMPENSATION
Pay and fringe benefits are tangible or extrinsic
rewards for personal services rendered. As in private in-
dustry, they also include partial compensation for unusual
hardship. However, in the Navy, as well as the other services,
privation and arduous duty are an inherent part of life while
in private industry, they are a more unusual occurrence.
Frequent family separations, lack of opportunity for a reason-
ably normal social life, long work hours, working conditions
that are often hazardous and lack of opportunities for off-
duty education and employment require adequate compensation at
a level comparable to wages and salaries paid in private
enterprise. Among the services the Navy's personnel retention
problem is currently the most acute. Every study conducted
in recent years has found the key problem to be a deficit in
mid-range experience (personnel with 4-14 years experience).
Table 1 summarizes the imbalances in the force structure on
Report of the Secretary of the Navy's Task Force on





MILITARY PERSCimSL IMBALANCES, JUNE 1965
Completed Officer Enlisted
Years of Service Overage/Defici t Overage Deficit
0-3 + 15% + 14%
4-14 - 25% - 28%
15 & over Even + 50%
Source: U.S., Department of Defense, Report of the
First Quadrennial Review of Military Compen-
sation, Modernizing Military Pay , Vol. I,
Active Duty Compensation (VJashington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1967), p. S-3
Table 2 illustrates the attrition of the Navy's manpower force
and clearly shows that the greatest losses occur at the 4 and
20 year points which correspond to the end of a first enlist-
ment and initial eligibility for retirement.
Pay is a Retention Issue
For years it has been assumed that the main reason
people were not making the Navy a career was because the level
of pay, as an incentive, was insufficient to motivate personnel














Years of Service 20 30
Source: U.S., Department of the Navy, Office of the
Secretary of the Navy, Report of the Secre -
tary of the Navy's Task Force on Navy/Marine
Corps Personnel Retention , Vol. I. (Washington
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 4.
the issue was not completely clear since family separation,
sea duty, frequent moving and other issues were considered
r
to be important variables as well. As a result, several studies
have been conducted recently to determine what officers and men
consider to be the important factors in deciding whether to
choose a Navy career or revert to civilian life. The fact
that pay was considered important was not surprising, but the
overwhelming response placing pay so far out in front of the
many other considerations was surprising. The appropriate
parts of three of these surveys are summarized below.
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The Institute of Naval Studies conducted an officer
study that requested personnel to indicate which of the thirteen
incentives offered vzould motivate them to remain on active
duty. Six of the incentives were considered to be reasonably
attractive. Table 3 shows that the top three attractions were
compensation items: a 20 percent pay raise, compensation
equal to civil service, and $1000 per child per college year.
The 20 percent pay raise was so attractive that 40 percent of
those officers planning to leave the service would extend their
active duty for the money differential.
The Institute of Naval Studies also conducted a survey
2
of 10,000 enlisted personnel. In this survey, 22 incentives
were offered ranging from more prestigious uniforms to junior
college. An offer of 2 years junior college in exchange for
4 years of service proved to be the most attractive. Other
varieties of college proposals closely followed the top selec-
tion. A $5,000 re-enlistment bonus also stood very high as
a re-enlistment incentive. One can only speculate why junior
The Institute of Naval Studies (Center for Naval
Analysis--Franklin Institute), "Manning Study Officer Survey,"
Philadelphia, 1965, pp. 1-5. (Mimeographed).
2The Institute of Naval Studies (Center for Naval
Analysis--Franklin Institute), "Enlisted Retention Incentives,"
Philadelphia, 1964, pp. 1-10. (Mimeographed).

TABLE 3
ATTRACTIVENESS OP INCENTIVES FOR OFFICERS'
IN 25-27 YEAR AGE GROUP
Percent who say they would






20^ Pay Raise 74.9 68.0 40.6
Compensation = Civil
Service 69.5 65.6 39.7
$1000/Child /College
Year 56.9 52.8 26.2
Sea and Shore Speciali-
zation 45.5 41.6 35.6
Improved Living Quarters 47.3 36.8 18.1
4-6 Year Home Continuity 26.5 38.0 27.1
Officers of different designators, family status
and career intentions.
Incentives designed to appeal primarily to officers
who are undecided about a career, who intend to leave active
duty as reserves, or who intend to retire after 20 years of
service.
Source: The Institute of Naval Studies (Center for
Naval Analysis - Franklin Institute),





college proposals stood very high, but it is very likely that
money was the prime factor for even junior colleges require
cash for tuition, books, board and room.
The Bureau of Naval Personnel's Personnel Research
Activity questioned 16,126 enlisted personnel, most of whom
were in their first enlistment concerning policy changes that
would influence them to remain on active duty. Both career
and non-career decided personnel were questioned and compared
with respect to their opinions. As shown on Table 4, pay and
allowances led the list of possible policy changes that would
have the greatest effect on their career decisions.
The Secretary of the Navy's Task Force on Navy/Marine
2
Corps Personnel Retention also conducted a survey. Selected
Navy personnel attended seminars and answered questionnaires
concerning retention. The findings supported the results of
previous surveys in that the individuals as a group considered
pay and allowances to be very important and that retention
U.S., Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Per-
sonnel, Navy Per sonnel Survey 64 -1 (Washington, D.C.: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1965), p. 3-8.
o
U.S., Department of the Navy, Office of the Secretary
of the Navy, Repor t o f the Secretary of the Navy's Task Force
on Navy/Marine Corps Personne l Retention , Vol. IV, Ch. 14
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could be improved significantly by improving the level of pay
in the Navy.
Pay represents more than just the ability to buy
material goods and services. Whyte states: "... the workers
position . . . is a function of two factors: his economic
status and his social status ." He defines economic status as
2
earnings. He goes on to say,
Social status is a more complex item and is not so readily
defined. We mean by social status the prestige people
attach to jobs . . . This prestige comes from skill re-
quired by the job, from its importance in the production
process, from the seniority that people have to have in
order to hold the job, from the money the job pays, and
from other factors.
3
It is important to note that pay affects a man's
economic status and social status which, in turn, determine
his position in society. A Navy man's desire for status is
no different than a civilian's and military pay, just like
civilian pay, plays an important role in determining positions
in the status structure.
The Navy, unfortunately, cannot pay enough money to
be completely selective. As a result, other benefits are
William F. Whyte, Money and Motivation (New York:





used in an effort to stay competitive with private enterprise
and to keep its people satisfied.
The Existing Compensation System
The salary paid employees is not a complete description
of the costs the employer incurs or the benefits the employee
receives as a result of the employee contract in modern com-
pensation systems. Military, civil service and typical private
enterprise systems provide payments and benefits in addition
to the salary. The summation of salary plus other payments
and benefits can be called "total compensation."
Different combinations of a wide variety of items have
been treated as compensation at one time or another in the
military. There is no generally accepted definition of those
payments and benefits which comprise total compensation. The
Hubbell Staff found it necessary to construct a definition for
total military compensation. This definition stated that a
compensation item both costs the government money and is of
value to the recipient in one or more of three ways : (1) it
adds cash to his current income; (2) it permits him to realize
a current net cash savings; or (3) it creates a present value
to him based on the prospect of a future receipt.
U.S., Department of Defense, Report of the First
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In conjunction with constructing this definition, the
Hubbell Staff classified military pay into three categories:
1. Regular compensation-- the permanent components of
income received by all personnel each pay period.
2. Special and premium pays- -taxable cash pays that
depend on special occupational qualifications or
duty performance.
3. Supplemental benefits--retirement , survivor and
health benefits, etc.
Regular compensation
Under the existing pay system in the military, regular
compensation is made up of four separate components: basic
pay, quarters allowance, subsistence allowance and the Federal
income tax advantage on non- taxable quarters and subsistence
allowances. Regular compensation is the equivalent of civilian
salary excluding any retirement contribution; that is, it pro-
vides a salary definition comparable to that of the Federal
civil servant after the 6.5 percent deduction for the Civil
2Service Retirement Fund. It has been regularly used by the
House Committee on Armed Services under the title of "regular
military compensation."
Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, Modernizing Mili -
tary Pay , Vol. II, Appendices I-IX (Washington, D.C.: Govern-







Basic pay is a taxable cash payment that varies accord-
ing to the pay grade and longevity of the recipient. It
accounts for about two-thirds of an individual's salary and one-
half of his total compensation, and it is the major compensation
element in the military pay system.
Quarters allowance is provided to the member either
in cash or in kind. Quarters-in-kind is government provided
housing. Payments in cash are those specified, non- taxable
rates which vary according to the pay grade and are disbursed
in full to the member.
Subsistence allowance may also be provided to the mem-
ber either in cash or in kind. All officers are paid a monthly
rate of $47.88. Enlisted personnel are usually provided
rations-in-kind in military messes, or they are permitted to
mess separately and draw a cash allowance in lieu of food. In
either case the compensation value is based on the government's
raw food cost.
Tax advantage is a military compensation item because
the quarters and subsistence allowances are non-taxable. The
tax advantage is the amount of additional cash income that a
serviceman would need in order to have the same take home pay




The amount of tax advantage pertaining to a specific
amount of nontaxable allowances will vary according to family
size because dependency status and the associated tax exemp-
tions influence income tax liability. Nontaxable income pro-
vides a bigger tax saving to a man with one or two dependents
than to an individual with six tax exemptions. Therefore,
to determine its total value, tax advantage must be caluclated
for each pay grade, longevity step and family size.
Thus, regular compensation, as explained above, depends
not only on pay grade and longevity step, but also on family
size and whether a member is residing in government furnished
quarters or drawing quarters allowance.
Special and premium pays
These pays can generally be categorized as occupational
or contingency pays. As the name implies, occupational pays
are awarded to individuals possessing skills in occupations
where personnel shortages exist. Contingency pays are those
which are contingent upon the individual performing some
specified form of duty (such as hazardous duty) , or enduring




1. Medical, dental and veterinary pay- -for officers
possessing these professional skills to induce
them to remain on active duty.
2. Proficiency pay--is paid to enlisted men possess-
ing critical skills where training time is long
and costly and retention rates are low as a device
to encourage reenlistment.
3. Regular reenlistment bonus--is paid to enlisted
personnel who reenlist as an incentive for doing
so.
4. Variable reenlistment bonus--is for enlisted per-
sonnel in skill areas where critical deficiencies
exist as a device to encourage reenlistment
selectively; this bonus is paid in addition to
the regular reenlistment bonus, but is paid only
for the first reenlistment
.
The contingency pays are
1. Incentive pay (hazardous duty) --encompasses several
pays, the purpose of which is to provide officer
and enlisted personnel an incentive to volunteer
for hazardous duty. Examples are flight pay, sub-
marine duty pay, carrier flight deck duty pay and
demolition duty pay.
2. Diving duty pay- -is payable to both officer and
enlisted personnel to encourage voluntary parti-
cipation in a hazardous occupation.
3. Hostile fire pay--is paid only to those individuals
assigned to duties where they are subject to death
or injury due to enemy action and only during the
periods they incur such a risk.
4. Sea and foreign duty pay--is a special pay for en-
listed personnel assigned to shipboard duty or
duty in designated foreign stations.
5. Separation pays--include lump sum terminal leave
pay, reserve readjustment pay, failure of pro-
motion severence pay and disability pay. The first
example compensates the individual for leave
earned but not taken while the other examples are
intended to compensate the individual for the






The remaining elements of military compensation are
grouped under supplemental benefits. They may be received in
the form of cash, a service that would otherwise cost them
money or a savings opportunity.
Current year retirement accruals are neither a present
payment nor a current budget cost to the government; yet, they
properly are classified as compensation. They represent an
estimate of value is based upon actuarial assumptions such
as mortality rates, retention rates and fluctuations in force
size.
Dependency and indemnity compensation includes payments
made to the survivors of military personnel who die in the
line of duty or from injuries sustained while on active duty.
The estinated value of future benefits is considered compen-
sation.
Death gratuities are lump sum payments made to the
beneficiaries of members who die while on active duty. This
item is also considered to be compensation.
Social Security contributions by the government to the
Social Security Fund represent compensation. Since the Social
Security program is an insurance program, the government's
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contribution creates a present value to the member based on
the prospect of future benefits.
Medical care for dependents and servicemen is compen-
sation. As compensation, it is valued at the cost to the
government of all dependent care and care for the members
which did not result from the hazards of military duty. The
costs of providing medical care for training and battle
connected injuries are excluded from compensation.
Commissary and exchange privileges are one of the most
controversial elements of compensation. They are usually
overestimated by civilians and underestimated by the military.
These privileges provide an opportunity for military members
to purchase merchandise at lower prices than they would pay
in the civilian market. The savings realized are difficult
to estimate and depend on many variables. The cost the govern-
ment incurs in operating these facilities have long been
considered to be a part of compensation. If they are ever put
on a self-supporting basis, this element will disappear
entirely from military compensation.
Inadequacies of the Present Pay System
As previously pointed out, personnel retention is a
problem in the Navy- -particulary in the 4-14 year experience

U.S., Department of Defense, Commanders Digest , Vol. 4
No. 32, "Hubbell Pay Review Findings Released by Defense
Department" (May 11, 1968), pp. 3-4.
2
U.S., Department of Defense, Report of the First
Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, Modernizing
23
group. Servicemen themselves say that inadequate compensation
is a major cause of the problem. Navy personnel lack con-
fidence in the present pay system because:
1. It is complex and confusing.
2. It does not reward men equitably.
3. It cannot be compared and adjusted equitably in
relation to trends in civilian earnings.
There are 26 separate elements that make up military
pay and, while an individual is usually not entitled to all
of them, this fragmented military compensation system does
confuse the typical serviceman. It is doubtful that as many
as 1 percent of the individuals in the Navy know how to compute
the value of their compensation and those that do, have no way
of comparing their earnings with the earnings of their private
enterprise and civil service counterparts.
The Navy recently, in a Louis Harris survey, asked
officer and enlisted personnel who were just completing their
initial tour of duty (potential careerists) to estimate their
military earnings. They consistently underestimated earnings
2
throughout a military career by 10 to 24 percent.
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The Kubbell Staff conducted a survey of banks and
finance companies to ask how financial institutions valued
military compensation for lending purposes. Interestingly
enough, they found that these institutions underestimated
actual salaries by 50 percent for an E-3, 34 percent for an
0-1, 13 percent for an E-7 and 4 percent for an 0-6.
The fragmentation of military pay leads to confusion;
however, another reason why military pay is undervalued
results from the numerous ways in which it is received. Un-
like the civilian, who receives most of his compensation in
the form of taxable cash, the serviceman receives less than
260 percent of his compensation in that form. Table 5 shows
the methods of payment and their relative impact on total
military compensation.
In addition to being complex and confusing, another
related problem is that military salaries do not reward career
men equitably. As shown above, less than 60 percent of
military compensation is related to services performed. The
remainder is determined by dependency status, whether the
Military Pay , Vol. I, Active Duty Compensation (Washington, D.C.:








Method of Payment Percent
of Total
Taxable Cash 58.8
Nontaxable Cash Allowances 11.5
Allowances-in-Kind, Nontaxable 8.7
Savings (Medical, Tax Advantage, etc.) 9.5
Deferred Compensation (Retirement
Social Security, etc.) 11.
5
TOTAL 100
Source: U.S., Department of Defense, Report of the
First Quadrennial Review of Military Compen-
sation, Modernizing Military Pay , Vol. I,
Active Duty Compensation (Washington, D.C.:




member is provided bis allowances-in-kind or draws them in
casb and wbetber he stays to collect retirement. For example,
an E-5 with eight years service receives a salary in the
following range:
Bachelor living on base $4,647
Bachelor living off base 5,412
Married man living off base 5,859
Married man in Government Quarters . . . 6,264
Allowances, such as housing and subsistence allowances,
bear little relationship to actual costs and have been ad-
justed infrequently in the past 25 years despite a considerable
increase in the cost of living. Quarters allowances have been
adjusted three times since 1946, while basic pay has been
adjusted eleven times (five times since 1963) . The typical
family living off base spends considerably more than their
quarters allowance for housing. The one- third of our career
families who can be housed on base forfeit only their quarters
allowance and consequently are generally subsidized compared to
those who live off base. For example, this writer's housing
costs in the Washington, D.C. area are $260 a month. A
Lieutenant Commander who is able to get government quarters




The imputed retirement contribution is considered to
be a part of total salary for all members; however, only 46
percent of career enlisted and 18 percent of all officers,
career and non-career, will retire and realize a benefit in
return for this invisible deduction. Hence, it discourages
mid-length careers and does not become a positive incentive
2factor until about the eighth year. Then, it tends to lock
people in the Navy until they retire- -most of them at the 20
year point.
The third problem is that it is difficult, if not
nearly impossible, to compare military pay to civil service
and private enterprise salaries. When it has been compared,
as accurately as possible, it has been found to lag consider-
ably behind civilian and civil service salaries. This lag
will be discussed in the next chapter.
The existence of numerous pay elements, many of which
are hidden or partially hidden from the eyes of all but the
experienced analysts, makes a true comparison by the typical
serviceman impossible. VJhen he does make a comparison, which
he frequently does when trying to decide whether to remain






in the service, he invariably underestimates his military
salary. He generally sees his salary as the amount he reports
for income tax purposes or the sum of his pay checks received
during the year. Civilian employment opportunities will
generally appear, on the surface, to be more rewarding
financially than a career in the Navy.

CHAPTER II
THE HUBBELL PROPOSALS FOR A NEW
COMPENSATION SYSTEM
For the past three years, servicemen have become
familiar with the name "Hubbell Plan" and the rumor that a
revolutionary new compensation system is being proposed for
the uniformed services. Few people, however, including the
very concerned military careerists, really have knowledge of
what the new system would mean to them. Variations of the
same question have been asked over and over again, "How will
the Hubbell proposals affect ra^ pay now and when I retire?"
At the same time, worried military managers are asking the
question, "Will the Hubbell System help us bolster our sagging
personnel retention programs?" The many questions that have
been asked actually relate to one central question, "What is
the Hubbell Plan for modernizing military pay?"
A general answer to that central question is that the
Hubbell proposals encompass two separate and distinct compen-




(careerists) and one for men who are discharging their military-
obligations (noncareerists)
.
The typical noncareerists are young (average age 20),
single (84 percent have no dependents), and are in the process
of discharging their military obligations (80 percent will
return to civilian life after the completion of an initial
enlistment and less than 10 percent will serve to retirement).
Most of their enlistments are spent in training or deployed
in operational units. The pressure of the draft indirectly
assures the Navy of having adequate numbers of enlistees, as
many young men would rather spend three years in the Navy than
two years as a draftee in the Army.
Most noncareerists are fed, housed, clothed and provided
medical and dental care in Government facilities in the in-
terest of economy, convenience and often times, due to necessity.
In return for their essential services, our society assumes
the responsiblity of compensating them fairly and equitably
in relation to their civilian counterparts who do not serve.
Fairness and equity are the major considerations in determining
their compensation, supply and demand are secondary factors to
be considered.




The typical careerists, on the other hand, are older
(average age 30) , married (83 percent have dependents) , and
live in private housing (67 percent of those with dependents
live in private housing). Thus, most of them have the same
family related financial responsibilities as their civilian
counterparts. There is no assured supply of careerists as
there is of noncareerists. In fact, there is but one source,
recruitments from the noncareer force. Training, experience
and education make them difficult to replace and, at the same
time, afford them excellent opportunities for jobs in private
enterprise.
The issue of voluntary commitment to military service
is a major consideration when determining compensation for
these men. Fairness and equity as well as supply and demand
are central issues in determining compensation for careerists.
Private enterprise competes with the Government for the ser-
vices of these trained men, so the compensation system must
take on the added burden of doing its part to attract, retain
and motivate the right kinds of people. At the same time, the
compensation must be fair and equitable in the interest of
simple justice.





Under the Hubbell Plan, the compensation distinctions
between the careerists and the noncareerists are: (1) the
nature of the individual commitments to military service and,
(2) the manner in which their compensation is received.
Most careerists are family men and thus, receive most
of their compensation in cash. A pertinent and major consider-
ation must be the ability of the Government to provide housing.
Prior to World War II, most servicemen were provided Government
housing, but today, only one- third of the married men have
this benefit. Yet, the compensation system has not been ad-
justed to keep pace.
A vast majority of the noncareerists are single men
who live on bases or ships, and therefore, they receive a
large part of their income in kind.
Obligatory service is generally accompanied by consid-
erable compensation in kind. Voluntary service usually goes
hand-in-hand with receiving largely cash compensation.
Noncareer Compensation System
The noncareer force was defined by the Policy Board
to include all military personnel in the pay grades E-l, E-2,




than two years service and those in pay grades E-4 and E-5
with between two and four years service and a total active
duty commitment of less than six years.
As previously explained, the basic necessities are
usually provided to these men by the Government in kind. This
practice, while it is old enough to be a part of military folk-
lore, is still appropriate due to the nature of the activities
of men in their initial enlistments--mostly training and de-
ployed operations. Cash compensation includes basic pay after
taxes. This money can be spent for other than basic necessities
in accordance with individual desires. In the few cases where
necessities are not furnished in the form of tax-free allowances.
In addition, married noncareerists are paid quarters allow-
ance.
This concept of compensation assures adequate care
for these young single servicemen. This method of providing
the basic requirements for health and welfare necessary for
the performance of rigorous duties, is in the best interests
of the men and the military units to which they are assigned.
Since 84 percent of the noncareerists have no dependents, this
is appropriate thinking.
p. 1.
Commanders Digest , "Hubbell Pay Findings Released",
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This system, as pointed out in Chapter I, does not
lend itself to easy comparisons of military pay to the pay of
the noncareerists' civilian counterparts. There are two ob-
vious alternatives to this system. One would be to estimate
the value of the items furnished in kind and attribute it to
total salary. The other would be to pay a total salary and
2
collect for the items furnished in kind.
Estimation of items furnished in kind would create
more confusion and controversy than now exists. What is the
value of a bunk in a 30 man living compartment aboard a des-
troyer? Payment from a total salary would necessitate huge
budgetary expenditures and create an administrative burden of
collecting for items furnished in kind.
The Hubbell proposals reflect a decision to avoid the
issues by recommending that noncareerists be neither charged
for nor credited with the value attached to income furnished
in kind. Their proposal focuses on disposable income after
taxes and provisions for necessities. The recommendation is






for the adoption of two standards for minimum non career
residual income to insure that satisfactory service does not
involve economic penalty. The standards are:
Standard I—Minimum Wage Floor
Military pay rates should be such that, regardless
of pay grade or longevity step, a noncareer member's
residual income would at least equal the average
residual income of a single male civilian employed
full time who is earning the legal minimum wage.
Standard II- -Parity with Civilian Counterpart
Military pay rates should be such that the residual
income of the noncareer member whose performance is
fully satisfactory is at least equal to the average
residual income of his civilian counterpart, defined
as a single male high school graduate of the same
age who is employed full time in the civilian economy.
The Hubbell Staff applied these standards to the
existing compensation structure for noncareerists and found
3the rates of pay to be adequate. What is adequate today,
however, may not be adequate tomorrow in our dynamic economy.
Future adjustments will be necessary as the cost of living
rises and promotion opportunities in the military change.
Another recommendation worthy of note in this paper,












pay." The reason behind this recommendation is that people
would then be less likely to compare it to civilian salaries.
While this recommendation might seem insignificant and just
another change in military "jargon" its impact would probably
be tremendous
.
In summary, according to the Hubbell Report, the ex-
isting principles, concepts and rates of pay are equitable
for the noncareer force. Application of the recommended stand-
ards would insure fair and equitable treatment of noncareer
members by avoiding possible economic penalty. Income received
in kind would be adjusted as required to continue providing
the necessary goods and services regardless of Government cost.
The cash portion of total compensation would be adjusted to
keep pace with changes in the private sector. Family allow-
ances, which would still be paid to the few noncareerists with
dependents, would be adjusted to reflect increases in rents in
the civilian economy. Rent is the major additional expense
incurred by members with dependents. Thus, total noncareer
compensation would be kept abreast of trends in the private
U.S., Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) , What
Should Military Pay Reform Mean to You ? (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 19.
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sector and thereby insure fairness, equity and attainment of
noncareer pay standards.
Career Compensation System
Improvement in the compensation system for noncareeris ts
is important in the interest of justice; however, improvement
in the compensation system for careerists is also vital to this
nation's security.
Noncareerists were defined in the last section; career-
ists constitute the remainder of the military force (48 percent
of the total). All officers, all personnel in pay grades
E-6 and above, all E-4s and E-5s with over four years service,
and all E-4s and E-5s with between two and four years service
and a six year active duty commitment are defined as career-
2
ists.
The most significant finding in the entire Hubbell
study is that a basic overhaul in career force compensation is
needed to attain the objectives specified by the Secretary of
Defense. Both the system and levels of compensation are attack-
ed as being inadequate.






The existing compensation system was appropriate for
the period in which it was designed because it was related to
the pay conditions that existed then. But, times have changed
markedly, both in the private sector and in the military. The
compensation system just has not kept pace. The many short-
comings of the existing basic pay and allowances system were
explained in Chapter I. The following is an overview of the
Hubbell proposals for improving the career compensation system
and the rationale behind them.
Salary system
One major shortcoming of the existing system is that
it is complex and confusing because of its myriad of pays,
allowances, and hidden elements (e.g. tax advantage and retire-
ment contribution) . The lack of a standard and accepted
definition of what constitutes total compensation contributes
to the confusion. A second major shortcoming identified in
Chapter I, is that the system is inequitable. Compensation
depends on pay grade dependency status and the availability
of Government housing, not on the work done or job held.
The conclusions that the existing pay system is no




That for the career force, the five separate compensa-
tion elements of (1) basic pay, (2) quarters allow-
ance (cash or furnished), (3) subsistence allowance
(cash or furnished)
, (4) the Federal income tax advan-
tage realized on nontaxable quarters and subsistence
allowances and, (5) the imputed retirement contribution
be incorporated into a schedule of full salaries based
only on pay grade and years of service for pay.^
This recommendation means that all careerists would be
paid a fully taxable salary, just as most civilians now are.
The same salary would be paid to all members of the same rank
and with the same years of service for pay regardless of
dependency status. This total salary would be subject to
Federal income tax
.
Fair rental for Government housing would be paid
either in cash or by payroll deduction. The amount of rent
would be the lower of: (1) the fair rental value as deter-
mined for each location or, (2) the 75th percentile of the
2housing expense for F1IA mortgage holders with equal salary.
The upper limit would protect families who are placed in
Government quarters that exceed their needs . There would be
no charge for shipboard or field accommodations ; barracks and
bachelor officer quarters rates would be arrived at by applying
"








the same procedures to determine rental rates for family dwel-
lings.
Government furnished subsistence would also be paid
for in cash or by payroll deduction. The rate would be:
(1) the raw food cost when the member has no option but to
buy (aboard ship), or (2) the raw food cost plus reasonable
preparation and serving charges when the member does have an
option. Estimating preparation and serving charges would be
difficult; however, guidance could be obtained by relating
charges to the nonprofit and nonfood charges of similar non-
military food service operations (e.g. university cafeterias).
In addition, a vested contribution of 6.5 percent of
full salary would be made to military retirement by all career-
2ists. Retirement pay will be discussed in more detail later
in this chapter.
These changes would undoubtedly improve the visibility
of pay and remove the existing inequities as well. In short,
the changes outlined above would cure two of the three major
ills afflicting the present compensation system.






Probably the most important deficiency in the existing
system is the lack of an agreed upon quantitative standard for
relating military to civilian salaries. There is no standard
to facilitate comparisons between military pay, Federal civil-
ian and private enterprise salaries. Most careerists, and
military managers for that matter, do not know how pay rates
are set or how pay raises are computed. It is inevitable then
that the system, as it exists, lacks credibility in the eyes
of servicemen.
The basic policy standard for military pay was recom-
mended by the Hook Commission in 1948 and generally accepted
by the Congress in the Career Compensation Act of 1949.
Military pay was to be equivalent to pay in the civilian econ-
omy except at the highest grades where it was to be equivalent
to Federal civil service pay.
Since then, the policy has been reaffirmed many times
by the President and by the Congress. However, the policy is
meaningless unless the servicemen themselves are convinced
that it is translated fairly into pay.
U.S., Department of Defense, Advisory Commission on
Service Pay, Career Compensation for the Armed Forces (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 159.
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Lacking a quantitative pay standard, military pay in-
creases have followed a dreary path of consistently lagging
behind Federal civilian increases. From 1945 to 1965, Federal
civilian salaries were increased by 173.1 percent while mili-
tary compensation was increased by 137.1 percent.
Another result of having no quantitative standard is
that there has been no consistent practice for computing the
value of military pay increases. The base to which adjustments
have been applied has varied from one raise to the next. Some-
times the base will be basic pay, sometimes it will be quarters
allowance and then again it might be total compensation, what-
ever that is. In some instances, pay raises have been computed
as a percentage of total compensation but applied to basic pay.
In other instances, they have been computed as a percentage
of total compensation but applied to basic pay. In other in-
stances, they have been computed as a percentage of basic pay
and applied to total compensation. There are many other varia-
tions of past practices which confuse the issue even more. Why
are so many inconsistent methods used? Congress does not know
why, military managers do not know why, so certainly the con-
fused serviceman cannot be expected to know why.





Still another result of the lack of a quantitative pay
standard is the ineffective use of pay raises. Frequently
they have been used to improve retention in the lower pay grades;
however, some have necessarily been used to reduce the compres-
sion in the pay structure caused by such raises. In the past
five years, there has been no selectivity applied and annual ad-
justments have been fixed percentage across-the-board increases.
Finally, because members do not understand how their
pay is arrived at, the whole system lacks credibility.
It is inevitable that servicemen, like their civilian
counterparts, will make frequent comparisons between their pay
and that of their civilian contemporaries, especially when
deciding whether to make the military a career. Most members
do not recognize all of their compensation. The result is
usually the decision that the private sector is much more re-
warding economically.
Servicemen must be assured that their pay is set and
kept on a par with their counterparts in other employment. An
explicit quantitative standard that applies not only to the
total system, but to each pay grade in the system is necessary
to facilitate comparisons. Confidence in procedures is vital
to any pay system. This confidence must come from being able to




Two quantitative standards for military pay were de-
veloped recently completely independently of each other. While
both approaches produce nearly the same results, the concepts
and methods differ considerably.
Cohort standard
The first approach, called the Cohort standard, uses
the same criteria as Federal wage board surveys. It is based
on estimating the civilian earning opportunities of military
personnel. This standard is derived by measuring the earnings
of a group of civilians (cohorts) who share a specified set of
pay related characteristics with servicemen in a particular
pay grade.
The basic assumption behind the Cohort standard is that
military and civilian work are so different that meaningful
comparisons are impracticable. We can, however, collect sta-
tistics and compute the level of pay that applies to a group
of civilian veterans with the same pay related characteristics;
in other words, the best estimate of what careerists would be
making if they were civilians. This approach proceeds from
the judgment that since it is impracticable to pay the careerists
Modernizing Military Pay , Vol. I, Active Duty Compen-
sation
, p . 63 .
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for work they do, they should be paid in accordance V7ith what
they could have earned as civilians. There are few markets
for officers who command destroyers or men who fire and main-
tain 16 inch guns, but there are markets for men with the same
pay related characteristics such as age and education. This
method, even though it involves continued statistical computa-
tion, provides a rational quantitative standard by avoiding
rather than solving the problem of comparing military to non-
military work.
The Cohort standard is compared to the other approach,
the Work Level standard, later in this chapter.
Work Level standard
While the Cohort standard avoids the issue, the other
standard, called the Work Level standard, attacks the compara-
bility issue. The premise here is that military and nonmili-
tary work are not different enough to preclude comparison. The
Work Level standard asserts that while some military jobs are
unique and that certain characteristics of military life (e.g.
discipline and lack of a defined work week) make it different,
the technologically modern military does have jobs similar to




jobs in private enterprise. All the services, and the Navy is
no exception, have occupational classification systems which
integrate the work and pay relationships of purely military
functions into a unified personnel structure. Many of the work
functions can be evaluated by civilian work standards. There-
fore, this standard asserts, it is not necessary to measure
the work of all military jobs by civilian standards, it is
only necessary to measure those jobs which can be measured
adequately. The military occupational and classification
systems can be used to extend the results into the jobs that
are solely or predominantly military functions.
The first step in the Work Level approach is the appli-
cation of civil service job evaluation techniques to military
jobs at selected grades. Based upon these evaluations, the
military structure and the civil service structure are then
linked. In applying this standard, the Hubbell Staff found
that valid linkage points are 0-8 with GS-18, 0-1 with GS-7
and E-3 with GS-3 (white collar) and WB-5 (blue collar). 2
The next step is to derive the appropriate intergrade










analyzing the work relationships among grades. The chain of
command and its influence on work spans must be included in
the analysis. Table 6 illustrates the results of applying
this standard to military officers.
The Work Level standard uses techniques that are used
and widely accepted in determining Classification Act (civil
service) pay and in linking the Foreign Service and Postal
2
Service structures to it. The Classification Act structure
is, in turn, linked to the private sector through the use of
annual Bureau of Labor statistics.
Comparison of the standards
Both standards were applied to compare military pay to
Federal civilian and private enterprise pay. The Cohort stan-
dard was sued to compare private enterprise to military pay
and the Work Level standard was used to compare civil service
to military pay. The results of both tests were similar
enough to reinforce the age-old contention that military pay
lags behind both private enterprise and Federal civilian pay.
Table 7 shows the results of application of the Cohort standard.








MILITARY-CIVIL SERVICE WORK SPAN COMPARISONS

















- — , , - .,. J
Source: U.S., Department of Defense, Report of the
First Quadrennial Review of Military Compen-
sation, Modernizing Military Pay , Vol. I,
Active Duty Compensation (Washington, D.C.:




MILITARY CAREER FORCE LAG BEHIND COHORT PARITY
Average Salary Adjusted
Required for Average
Pay Parity with 1 October 1967 Difference
Grade Cohort Military Salary $ %
0-10 $40,138 $35,614 $4,524 11.31
0-9 34,602 31,070 3,532 10.2
0-8 29,324 27,151 2,173 7.4
0-7 28,559 23,562 4,997 17.5
0-6 24,287 19,724 4,563 18.8
0-5 19,759 16,670 3,089 15.6
0-4 15,201 13,736 1,465 9.6
0-3 11,188 11,403 -215 -1.9
0-2 8,353 8,852 -499 -6.0
0-1 7,700 6,615 1,085 14.1
Comm Off $12,435 $11,528 $ 907 7.3%
W-4 $15,473 $12,904 $2,569 16 . 6%
W-3 11,836 10,887 949 8.0
W-2 10,151 9,310 841 8.3
W-l 8,459 8,217 242 2.9
Warr Off $10,595 $ 9,694 $ 901 8.5%































Career EM $ 6,927 $ 6,472 $ 455 6.67o
Proposed 1 October 1967 regular military compensation
rates adjusted to reflect imputed retirement credit of 6%% of




retirement contribution (salary = regular military compensation/
.935).
Source: U.S., Department of Defense, Report of the
First Quadrennial Review of Military Compen-
sation, Modernizing Military Pay , Vol. I,
Active Duty Compensation (Washington, D.C.:
Governmant Printing Office, 1967), p. 68.
enterprise pay by 7.2 percent overall with officer, warrant
officer and enlisted pays lagging by 7.3, 8.5 and 6.6 percent
respectively. Table 8 shows the results of application of
the Work Level standard. This test indicated that military
pay lags behind Federal civilian pay by 7.4 percent overall
with officer, warrant officer and enlisted pays lagging by
2
7.4, 8.3 and 5.4 percent respectively.
The similarity of the findings lends confidence to
the accuracy of the results and it seems to indicate that
either standard would be acceptable. Certainly, either one
is better than having no standard at all--which is the present
situtation. However, each standard does have its advantages
and disadvantages.
The extensive coverage of the Cohort system and the
massive averaging required make it a good method for estab-








MILITARY CAREER FORCE LAG BEHIND CIVIL SERVICE PARITY
Average Salary Adjusted
Required for Average
Pay Parity with 1 October 1967 Difference
Grade Civil Service Military Salary 1 $ %
0-10 $33,791 $35,614 $-1,823 -5.4%
0-9 30,144 31,070 -926 -3.1
0-8 27,055 27,151 -96 -0.4
0-7 25,356 23,562 1,794 7.1
0-6 22,387 19,724 2,663 11.9
0-5 18,709 16,670 2,039 10.9
0-4 14,858 13,736 1,122 7.6
0-3 11,737 11,403 334 2.8
0-2 9,327 8,852 475 5.1
0-1 7,548 6,615 933 12.4
Coram Off $12,444 $11,528 $ 916 7.4%
W-4 $15,126 $12,904 $ 2,222 14.7%
W-3 12,431 10,887 1,544 12.4
W-2 10,029 9,310 719 7.2
W-l 8,406 8,217 189 2.2
Warr Off $10,568 $ 9,694 $ 874 8.3%
All Off $12,325 $11,412 $ 913 7.4%
E-9 $11,330 $10,633 $ 697 6.2%
E-8 9,432 9,301 131 1.4
E-7 8,219 8,191 28 0.3
E-6 7,242 7,134 108 1.5
E-5 6,356 5,918 438 6.9
E-4 5,865 5,123 742 12.7
Career EM $ 6,843 $ 6,472 $ 371 5.4%
Adjusted to reflect imputed retirement credit of




Source: U.S., Department of Defense, Report of the
First Quadrennial Review of Military Compen-
sation, Modernizing Military Pay , Vol. I,
Active Duty Compensation (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 75.
of bias or distortion is reduced by the comprehensiveness of
the process and the reliance on actual earnings of a repre-
sentative part of the civilian labor force--former military
people.
The characteristics that make the Cohort standard a
good measure of overall comparability, also make it a poor
vehicle for making internal pay distinctions among pay grades
Intergrade differentials would be influenced by forces at
work in the economy which do not necessarily correspond to
internal work distinctions among military grades. Because
the Work Level standard deals with the issue of work spans as
a part of its basic analysis, it is a much better vehicle for
dealing with the kinds of internal pay distinctions that
exist in military organizational structures.
The Cohort standard is better suited for establishing
the general structure for comparing military pay with pay in
the private sector. The main disadvantage of the Work Level
standard is its dependence on somewhat arbitrary linkages
between a few military and civil service pay grades to locate
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the payline. If one linkage is wrong, then not only that
pay grade but much of the payline would be out of place.
Both approaches are reasonable and certainly better
than no standard at all. The Hubbell proposals endorse the
Work Level standard because:
1. The lag is less under it than under the Cohort
standard (a hedge against overstating the prob-
lem.
2. The procedure for handling internal pay distinc-
tions is clearly superior.
3. The application of the same process by the same
employer in setting both military and civil ser-
vice pay would contribute greatly to the over-
riding objective of having a pay standard--pay
system credibility.
2
The Work Level standard promises to get faster and
better support from careerists, military managers and the
Congress because it is used now in a system successfully.
A new concept would require extensive explanation and defense
It would be subject to suspect from the very beginning and
the questions and controversy would continue.
1
A payline is a series of rates, with one rate from
each grade and with all rates having a common meaning to each







The Hubbell proposal to convert the military pay sys-
tem to a salary system from the existing basic pay and allow-
ances system necessitates a proposal to change the procedure
for computing retired pay as well. The existing method of
determining retired pay by taking a fixed percentage (based
on years of service) of basic pay obviously could not be used
because basic pay would disappear.
In addition, military management has suspected, for
some time, that the retired pay system is not doing an adequate
job in our modern military--it discourages rather than en-
courages mid-length careers. As indicated earlier, retired
pay does not become a positive incentive for retention until
about the eighth year of service because it is largely hidden.
Equally undesirable, it then tends to lock people in the mili-
2tary until they can retire—most at the 20 year point.
Another problem noted by Admiral Hubbell is that the
present system does not provide sufficient income for retired
personnel when they need it the most--when they are over age
55 and usually "in fact" retired. He recently said:
Commanders Digest






Because nearly all military retirees get second jobs, the
present annuity is more than adequate in the years immed-
iately after retirement. This makes it very attractive
for most people to retire as soon as they can- -and the
majority do just this. But as wage levels go up in the
civilian economy, the level annuity falls further and
further behind, so that by the time a man is "really re-
tired" (at about age 55-60) , the military annuity is often
not enough to provide an acceptable full retirement income.
He went on to say:
Yet we can't justify paying annuities high enough to be
adequate for the full retirement of 55 to 60-year-old-men
to people about 40 years old who are really just changing
jobs . . . The present level annuity is too often more
than adequate first, then too often less than adequate in
later years; but the first fact prevents us from curing
the second problem. The way out of this box is to pay
one adequate annuity (Step 1) from the time a man first
retires until he reaches age 55 to 60, then pay a higher
annuity (Step 2) adequate for real retirement for the
rest of his life and protect the purchasing power of both
by raises that match increases in the cost of living.
The Hubbell proposals include three major changes to
correct these problems.
First, since basic pay would disappear, retirement
would be computed as a percentage of the high year's average
salary. 3
1969, p. 8.




VThat Would Military Pay Reform Mean to You?, p. 20.
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Second, instead of level monthly payments that are
adjusted only for cost of living increases, the proposed re-
tirement annuities would be paid in two steps, both of which
would be adjusted for cost of living increases:
1. Regular Retired Pay (Step 1) would be payable on
retirement and until the member reaches age 55 to
60, depending on the years of service at retire-
ment (age 60 for 20 years service, age 59% for
21 years and so on to age 55 for 30 years service)
.
2. Increased Retired Pay (Step 2) is designed to pro-
vide a fully adequate annuity that would be paid
after age 55-60 when the member is usually "in
fact" retired and will not have income from a
second job.*
Finally, in place of the present inferred charge of
6.5 percent of basic that a man never sees or gets back unless
he retires, and the deduction for social security, (presently
4.8 percent of the first $7,800 of basic pay), the new contri-
bution would be 6.5 percent of total salary which would include
2the social security contribution. The difference between
the 6.5 percent of full salary and the social security contri-
bution would be deposited in the members vested retirement
account. Should the member not serve to retirement, the






die prior to collecting the value of his account, the balance
of the account would be paid to his survivors
.
Under the new system, the social security income would
be considered to be a part of Increased Retired Pay (Step 2)
and not an additional annuity. However, social security
eligibility earned prior to conversion to the new system or
from private employment would not be affected.
The proposed retirement system seems to be the most
controversial part of the Hubbell Plan. The controversy ap-
parently stems from a lack of knowledge about the proposals
due to a lack of publicity and the feeling that adoption of
a new retirement system for those already committed to a
military career is a "breach of faith." A recent issue of
Navy Times, an unofficial but highly regarded weekly tabloid
that contains the latest "Navy news, contained many letters
to the editor that would seem to express the feelings of most
of our Navy careerists.
One letter, written by CWO-4 C.A. Devine USN says,
"The Hubbell Pay Plan: What is it? Why is it? Does anyone
other than Admiral Hubbell know?"
llfMail Call," Navy Times , Nov. 20, 1968, p. 19
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Another letter, written by Lt. B. L. Seaton, U.S.N,
says, "We who are near retirement are violently opposed to
any retirement legislation of any kind which does not contain
an option of retiring under the new plan or the one which was
the inducement for our choice of a Naval career."
As previously indicated, one of the reasons for the
controversy is poor publicity. The servicemen just have not
been adequately informed as to what management is proposing
concerning their pay.
Another influence in the controversy is man's tendency
2
to resist change. This resistance applies to military pay
as well as other changes.
Despite the controversy, the Hubbell proposals recom-
mend what appears to be a much more realistic retirement sys-
tem. It is similar to the Civil Service retirement system
and, like the active duty compensation system, this similarity
would help promote its credibility.
1
Ibid.
2Timothy W. Costellow and Sheldon S. Zalkind, Psychology




A DOLLAR COMPARISON OF THE TWO PAY SYSTEMS
An improved pay system that makes total compensation
more visible and easier to understand is a matter of vital
concern to military careerists. Adoption of a quantitative
pay standard to insure military/civilian salary parity is also
a very important issue in the eyes of most careerists. The
most Important issue, is however, "What would conversion to
the Hubbell Plan mean in take home dollars?" A related issue
of major concern to careerists is, "How would the Hubbell
proposals affect retirement pay-- in dollar terms?"
This chapter presents quantitative comparisons between
the existing pay system and the Hubbell proposals for both
active duty pay and retirement pay. The dollar amounts shown
in this paper for the Hubbell system are the amounts that
have been recommended for July 1969 implementation. The dollar
amounts shown for the existing system are the present rates
of pay adjusted to reflect a 12.6 percent increase in basic
pay. A 12.6 percent across-the-board raise is law and it most




acts to supersede the legislation by approving the Hubbell
Plan.
Active Duty Compensation
A representative selection of typical pay situations
is presented for comparison of the Hubbell system (salary
system) and the present pay and allowances system. Tables
9 through 16 illustrate these situations in detail. As pre-
viously indicated, it is necessary to include the legislated
12.6 percent across-the-board pay raise to permit a meaningful
comparison. The debate in Congress will be Hubbell Plan ver-
sus the 12.6 percent pay raise.
Federal income tax is a substantial deduction from
most members' gross pay. The amount of tax paid depends on
many variables such as outside income, method of computing
deductions and many more. While the author recognizes these
variables, it would be impossible to present all the possi-
bilities in this paper. Therefore, Federal Income tax compu-
tations are based on the assumptions of no outside income and
use of the standard deduction.
Petty Officer Third Class (E-4, Over 4 years, 1 Dependent )
Table 9 illustrates the pay situation for a man that
fits this pay description. He probably sees his pay as being
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$3,668.41 (reported for income tax purposes), or $5,928.51
(including quarters allowance) , or $5,410.31 (if he receives
and recognizes subsistence allowance as part of his nontaxable
income) . It is very unlikely that he would recognize the
tax advantage and the imputed retirement contribution. Under
the salary system, he would clearly see that his annual in-
come is $6,441.00. Take home pay would be $4,927.95 under the
present system and $5,288.92 under the salary system. In
addition, the man would have made a vested retirement contri-
bution for the year of $109.50 which would be returned to him
should he choose to terminate his service short of retirement.
The important points are that the man would be able to clearly
see his annual salary, and he would receive an increase in
take home pay of $360.97 per years.
Petty Officer Second Class (E-5, Over 8 years, 3 Dependents )
Table 10 shows the pay situation for a man fitting
this pay description. He most likely would see his gross
pay as either $4,568.40, or $5,918.40, or $6,400.20 under
the present system. Under the salary system, gross income of
$7,003.00 would be plainly visible. Take home pay would be
approximately the same under both systems.
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Petty Officer First Class (E-6, Over 10 years, 3 Dependents )
Table 11 illustrates that the probable estimates of
annual pay for a man fitting this description would be $5,196.72,
or $6,513.92, or $6,995.72 under the present system. His
gross pay would actually be $7,667.51 under the present sys-
tem or $7,734.00 under the salary system. A shift to the
salary system would mean an increase in take home pay of $94.83
per year and a contribution to vested retirement of $131.48
per year.
Chief Petty Officer (E-7, Over 12 years, 3 Dependents )
Table 12 shows that in this pay situation, a man would
in all likelihood estimate his annual pay to be $6,003.36,
or $7,382.16, or $7,863.96 when it really would be $8,613.18.
The salary system would clearly display this man's salary as
being $8,721.00. Conversion to the salary system would mean
an annual increase in take home pay of $133.75 and a vested
retirement contribution of $192.47 per year.
Lieutenant (0-3, Over 4 years, 2 Dependents )
Table 13 illustrates this pay situation. An officer
fitting this pay description would undoubtedly estimate his
annual pay as either $9,348.05 (basic pay as reported for in-
come tax purposes), or $11,483.21 (recognizing quarters and
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subsistence allowances). His salary would actually be $12,591.83
under the present system. The salary system recommends an
annual salary of $12,753.00. Conversion to the salary system
would result in an increase in take home pay of $172.67 and
an annual vested retirement contribution of $454.55.
i
Lieutenant Commander (0-4, Over 14 years, 3 Dependents )
A man with this pay description, as shown on Table 14,
would usually estimate his annual income as being either
$11,800.08 or $14,115.28 if he recognizes his allowances for
quarters and subsistence. His actual annual salary would be
$15,568.25 under the present system. Under the salary system
his salary would be a completely visible $17,027.00. Adoption
of the salary system would result in an increase of $917.52
per year in take home pay in addition to a contribution to
vested retirement of $732.36 per year.
Commander (0-5, Over 18 years, 4 Dependents )
Table 15 illustrates this pay situation. Under the
present system, an officer with this pay description would
usually estimate his annual pay as being $14,195.71, or
$15,950.27 if he adds annual quarters and subsistence allow-
ances. Actually, his annual gross pay would be $18,347.99.
Under the salary system, it would be $20,514.00. This change
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would result in an increase in take home pay of $1,539.82
and a vested retirement contribution of $959.01 annually.
Captain (0-6, Over 26 years, 4 Dependents )
As shown on Table 16, a man with this pay description
would usually estimate his annual pay as being either $18,553.32
or $21,311.05. The salary system would clearly show a salary
of $26,705.00 for this man. Conversion to the salary system
would result in an increase in take home pay of $2,147.35 per
year as well as a contribution to vested retirement of $1,361.43
While each of these illustrations describes the situa-
tion for married men, bachelors would benefit even more.
Their salaries would be the same as those for married men be-
cause salary, under the new system, would be based only on pay
grade and longevity. Family size, which influences current
"salary" through quarters allowance and tax advantage, would
not be a consideration in setting new salaries.
Retired Pay
Chapter II described the proposed two-step retirement
system that is part of the Hubbell proposals and the theory,
which is sound, behind it. Once again, however, the careerists
are most interested in dollar comparisons.

TABLE 9
COMPARISON OF THE TWO PAY SYSTEMS --PETTY OFFICER THIRD CLASS
(E-4, OVER 4 YEARS, 1 DEPENDENT)












or Salary $5,914.76 $6,441.00
Deductions




Retirement Contribution 238.45 109.50
TOTAL Deductions $ 986.81 $1,152.08




•Reflects 12.6 percent pay raise for FY 1970.
o
Computed at $1.32 per day.





COMPARISON OF THE TWO PAY SYSTEMS—PETTY OFFICER SECOND CLASS
(E-5, OVER 8 YEARS, 3 DEPENDENTS)
1




























TOTAL Deductions $1,045.08 $1,171.01
CASH TAKE HOME PAY $5,831.07 $5,831.99
VESTED RETIREMENT None $ 119.06
Reflects 12.6 percent pay raise for FY 1970.
2Computed at $1.32 per day.
o




COMPARISON OF THE TWO PAY SYSTEMS—PETTY OFFICER FIRST CLASS
(E-6, OVER 10 YEARS, 3 DEPENDENTS)




























TOTAL Deductions $1,251.56 $1,223.22
CASH TAKE HOME PAY $6,415.95 $6,510.78
VESTED RETIREMENT None $ 131.48
Reflects 12.6 percent pay raise for FY 1970.
"Computed at $1.32 per day.




COMPARISON OF THE TWO PAY SYSTEMS- -CHIEF PETTY OFFICER
(E-7, OVER 12 YEARS, 3 DEPENDENTS)












or Salary $8,613.18 $8,721.00
Deductions ~




Retirement Contribution 390.22 192.47
TOTAL Deductions $1,488.11 $1,462.18
CASH TAKE HOME PAY $7,125.07 $7,258.82
VESTED RETIREMENT None $ 192.47
Reflects 12.6 percent pay raise for FY 1970.
2Computed at $1.32 per day.
o




COMPARISON OF THE TWO PAY SYSTEMS- -LIEUTENANT
(0-3, OVER 4 YEARS, 2 DEPENDENTS)
Present System Salary System
Entitlements









or Salary $12,591.83 $12,753.00
Deductions 2




Retirement Contribution 607.62 454.55
TOTAL Deductions $ 2,599.54 $ 2,588.04
CASH TAKE HOME PAY $ 9,992.29 $10,164.96
VESTED RETIREMENT None $ 454.55
Reflects 12.6 percent pay raise for FY 1970.




COMPARISON OF THE TOO PAY SYSTEMS--LIEUTENANT COMMANDER
(0-4, OVER 14 YEARS, 3 DEPENDENTS)
1
1











or Salary $15,568.25 $17,027.00
Deductions _




Retirement Contribution 822.01 732.36
TOTAL Deductions $ 3,057.21 $ 3,597.84
CASH TAKE HOME PAY $12,511.64 $13,429.16
VESTED RETIREMENT None $ 732.36
Reflects 12.6 percent pay raise for FY 1970.




COMPARISON OF THE TWO PAY SYSTEMS- -COMMANDER
(0-5, OVER 18 YEARS, 4 DEPENDENTS)











or Salary $18,347.99 $20,514.00
Deductions




Retirement Contribution 922.72 959.01
TOTAL Deductions $ 3,832.87 $ 4,459.06
CASH TAKE HOME PAY $14,515.12 $16,054.94
VESTED RETIREMENT None $ 959.01
Reflects 12.6 percent pay raise for FY 1970.




COMPARISON OF THE TWO PAY SYSTEMS--CAPTAIN
(0-6, OVER 26 YEARS, 4 DEPENDENTS)











or Salary $23,311.05 $26,705.00
Deductions 2




Retirement Contribution 1,205.97 1,361.43
TOTAL Deductions $ 5,200.27 $ 6,446.87
CASH TAKE HOME PAY $18,110.78 $20,258.13
VESTED RETIREMENT None $ 1,361.43
Reflects 12.6 percent pay raise for FY 1970.




Because some of the recommended Regular Retired Pay
(Step 1) percentages are lower than present retired pay per-
centages, even when applied to the full salary, some members
would take retired pay cuts and others would get large retired
pay increases if everyone moved suddenly to the new system
with no transition or protection provision. But, to prevent
such occurrences , a five year transition period is proposed
to gradually phase into the new system without reducing any-
2
one f s retired pay. This provision is an integral part of
the proposals
.
Table 17 compares typical retirement annuities under
the present system with those proposed as a part of the Hubbell
Plan. In no instance does it show that a man would receive
less under the proposed system than under the present system.
Where the amounts under the present system and under Regular
Retired Pay (Step 1) of the proposed system are equal, save
pay provisions have been applied.
The proposed system is designed to encourage service-
men to remain on active duty beyond 20 years, preferably 30
years. For example, an E-9 would receive $5,180 per year

















20 E-7 $3,045 $3,045 $3,118
21 E-7 3,197 3,197 3,306
22 E-8 4,021 4,021 4,128
23 E-8 4,204 4,204 4,407
24 E-8 4,386 4,386 4,776
25 E-9 5,180 5,180 6,110
26 E-9 5,911 5,911 6,643
27 E-9 6,138 6,138 7,058
28 E-9 6,365 6,365 7,614
29 E-9 6,493 6,628 8,037
30 E-9 6,820 6,895 8,460
20 0-5 6,629 6,629 6,979
21 0-5 6,960 6,960 7,402
22 0-5 7,549 7,549 8,059
23 0-6 8,917 8,917 9,934
24 0-6 9,304 9,304 9,304
25 0-6 9,692 9,692 9,692
26 0-6 10,935 10,935 10,935
27 0-6 11,356 11,356 11,356
28 0-6 11,776 11,895 11,895
29 0-6 12,197 12,395 12,395
30 0-6 12,617 12,898 12,898
Includes the 2.1 percent cost of living increase
authorized for July 1968 to June 1969 retirees.
2Save pay provision is applied where the regular annuity
is equal to the present annuity.
3
period.




Source: U.S., Department of Defense, Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and
Reserve Affairs) , What Should Military Pay
Reform Mean to You ? (Washington, D.C.: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1969), p. 23.
under Step 1 and $6,110 per year under Step 2 if he would re-
tire after 25 years service. If he would remain another 5
years, his Step 1 annuity would be $6,895 and his Step 2
annuity would be $8,460.
Another example is the 0-6. If he retires after 23
years service, his Step 1 annuity would be $8,917 and his Step
2 annuity would be $9,934. If, however, he remained on active
duty to complete 30 years service, his Step 1 annuity would be
$12,898 and his Step 2 annuity would be $16,490. Both of
these examples show sizable increases in retired pay for stay-
ing beyond 20 years service. The proportional increase would
be much greater under the proposed system than it is under
the present system.
No Pay Reductions
Admiral Hubbell has stressed that no member will take
a pay cut. While it is true that every member will get an
increase in relation to existing pay if the salary system is
Ed Gates, "Hubbell Retirement Details Told, Plan's
Support Sought as Cost Rises," Navy Times , Dec. 4, 1968, p. 14.

76
implemented, some members (such as the E-5 with over 8 years
discussed in this paper) would benefit more from the 12.6
percent across-the-board pay raise than from implementation
of the salary system. Members who fit into this category,
however, total less than 5 percent of the career force.
This means that for every one man who would benefit more from
implementation of the 12.6 percent raise vice the salary sys-
tem, nineteen would continue to be underpaid. It is not just
to hold the pay of nineteen men below the comparability
standard so that one man can benefit by being paid above the
standard.
^ftiat Would Military Pay Reform Mean to You?, p. 15

CHAPTER IV
PROBABLE IMPACT ON RETENTION
Clarification of the Retention Problem
and Retention Objective
The problem refined
Prior to evaluating the probable impact of the Hubbell
Plan on retention, it is necessary to clarify the Navy's re-
tention problem and the objectives of the solutions to the
problem.
The Navy's retention problem, as it is generally under-
stood, is derived from a chain of logic as follovzs: there is
a shortage of experienced men that is causing operational
difficulties in the fleet; this shortage is due to inadequate
retention; therefore, retention must be improved. This logic
is incomplete because it ignores the fact that overall measures
of shortages and retention do not in themselves provide a
completely meaningful basis for either defining or solving the
retention problem.
A complete statement of the problem must include a




specialties as well as a complete qualitative description of
deficiencies in terms of experience and training.
The quantitative problem is serious. Although there
are differences between stated requirements and numbers of
people available in nearly all job specialties and pay grades,
in many, the situation is so badly out of balance as to in-
dicate the existence of shortages to the extent that the
operational level of the fleet is less than it should be.
Qualitatively, the problem is equally acute. The need
for middle grade personnel, combined with the inability of
the Navy to retain a sufficient number beyond obligated ser-
vice, has tended to reduce selectivity and resulted in the
promotion of less than high quality individuals. There has
been only token attrition (due to career stagnation) of career
2personnel prior to completion of twenty years service.
The advance of technology is further aggravating the
problem. In the past twenty-five years, the Navy has intro-
duced sophisticated automatic weapons and propulsion systems
to replace the outdated manual methods. Constant qualitative
Report of the Secretary of the Navy's Task Force on




improvement is clearly required to accommodate this advancing
technology
.
Qualitative improvement depends not only on an increase
in selectivity, but also on improved personnel management in
areas of training, utilization, career planning and promotion.
Contrary to popular opinion, increased retention would
result in an increase in dollar costs if the total force re-
mains constant and present personnel management practices are
continued. Decreases in training costs and operational costs
resulting from increased productivity would, under present
personnel management practices, be overcome by higher costs
for pay and retirement compensation due to increased seniority
and the increased number of retirees
.
These facts emphasize the necessity for careful evalua-
tion and definition of retention goals. The retention of more
people than needed and the lack of programmed attrition short
of retirement will not only result in higher costs; it will
also result in training more men than can be effectively util-
ized, thereby producing promotion stagnation accompanied by





frustration for the individual and resurgence of retention
problems
.
On the other hand, insufficient retention leads to a
high turnover of personnel without the Navy getting an ade-
quate return on its investment; insufficient retention also
leads to force instability and lower effectiveness.
The requirement for highly trained and experienced
personnel in the Navy continues to grow. The failure to retain
sufficient numbers has resulted in inadequate fleet readiness.
The high turnover rate resulting from a declining re-enlistment
rate seriously reduces the average experience level in the
fleet. The result is an upswing in material casualties through
2lack of adequate maintenance.
The objective
The Navy's primary retention objective as defined in
the Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual (NAVPERS 15791A - Rev-
1959) is:
... to develop and maintain a highly motivated and well
qualified career personnel cadre. It is, therefore, es-
sential the members selected for continuation in a Navy
Report of the Secretary of the Navy's Task Force on






career have demonstrated certain minimum capabilities or
potential . . .
The basic assumptions that accompany this broad ob-
jective are:
Personnel who create management problems, for whatever
reason, even though they meet performance criteria, should
not be continued in the Navy without individual deter-
mination.
Re-enlistment quality control will enhance retention by
identifying the problem personnel and the least productive
performers who have a negative influence on others.
A centrally controlled selective re-enlistment program based
on specific requirements in all ratings in which qualita-
tive and quantitative strength to requirement balance has
been achieved will upgrade the career cadre.
Extensive research is being conducted as to the means
to be employed to attain this broad objective. The basic re-
quirements are the appropriate incentives that will make a
Navy career attractive to more people, thereby improving
selectivity, and a personnel management system that can convert
this selectivity into an optimum Naval force. The Hubbell Plan,
many people believe, would produce incentives that would in-
crease selectivity.
1




What the Hubbell Plan Can Do For Retention
Effectiveness and efficiency
Two of Schleh's rules relating to getting more incen-
tive into pay are: (1) Make pay current; and (2) Make pay
appear fair to the man. The first rule indicates that pay
should reflect current, not past situations. The second rule
cautions that management often feels that their pay plan is
fair; however, to get real incentive, the employee has to feel
it is fair. In other words, make sure the pay plan is fair,
but also, sell that fairness to the men.
The Hubbell Plan has shown that the military pay sys-
tem is not fair; it is inequitable and it lags behind the
civilian systems in the level of pay. In addition, military
pay is so complex and confusing that it is difficult to deter-
mine what a man's pay really is. Military pay violates both
of the basic rules mentioned in the first paragraph. Therefore,
it is an inefficient system that has a negative effect on
career motivation. Herzberg has labeled factors of this type
"dissatisfiers" which operate to produce both low productivity
2
and negative attitudes when they are not equally administered.
Edward C. Schleh, Executive Management of Personnel
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1958), pp. 61-2.
2
Frederick Herzberg, Bernard Mausner, and Barbara
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The Hubbell proposals would increase the visibility,
credibility and amount of pay. Visibility would come from
eliminating the vast assortment of pays and allowances and
replacing them with annual salary. Credibility would result
from adoption of a quantitative standard to facilitate mean-
ingful comparisons of pay. The increase in the amount of pay
would come from an adjustment to close the gap between military
pay and civilian salaries. The result would be the elimina-
tion of a lfdissatisfier"--a negative influence on retention.
Simple logic indicates that removal of a negative force would
result in a positive change.
While the direction of the influence is clear, the
extent is not. The amount of increased retention is a function
of the size of the perceived pay raise which, in turn, is a
function of both the increased visibility of pay and the size
of the pay increase.
The research surveys summarized in Chapter I showed
that pay is a primary consideration in choosing a Navy career.
Therefore, -the Hubbell proposals could be reasonably expected
to help attract, retain and motivate to the career force more
of the kinds and numbers of career people the Navy needs . The
Bloch Snyderman, The Motivation to Work (2nd ed.; New York
John Wiley and Sons, 1959), pp. 96-7.
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net effect would be an increase in the effectiveness and ef-
ficiency of a stable size force. The Navy would be able to
increase the size of its force committed to operational (non-
training) activity, attain more nearly the desired force
structure in terms of years of service, and improve its quality
level. This increase in size and quality would clearly increase
the effectiveness and efficiency of the operating forces.
The extent of the increase is not as clear and could not be
estimated until better information is available.
Selective retention could be effectively utilized as
career attractiveness is enhanced. Selective pre-retirement
release of personnel from the career force in substantial
numbers would be facilitated by the vested retirement contri-
bution proposals which would augment separation pay.
The Hubbell proposals promise a more effective and
efficient Naval force because the operational part of the force
would be larger, better tailored to experience needs, and
made up of higher quality personnel.
Cost effectiveness
A major issue, especially in Congress will be, "Would
the increased effectiveness be worth the cost of attaining it?"
Quantifying the increased effectiveness and the costs involved
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is beyond the scope of this paper. It is valid to assume,
however, that if the extra costs involved were modest, then
the recommendations would likely be cost effective. If no
extra costs were involved or if actual cost savings could be
expected, then the recommendations would be clearly cost
effective, regardless of the exact amount of any effectiveness.
Four major cost implications would be involved:
1. First term training and associated turnover costs
would decline as additional continuations permit
reductions in inputs.
2. Active force compensation costs would rise as the
force becomes relatively more senior and draws
higher salary rates.
3. Separation payments would increase as force managers
generate the extra attrition necessary to attain a
balanced Naval force in years of service.
4. Retirement costs will decline if fewer people enter
the retired rolls as more are separated after opti-
mum career lengths short of retirement. -"-
Only the first two results would occur if no changes
are made to present personnel management practices. Personnel
managers must effect adequate selectivity practices to tailor
the Naval force before the latter two results would occur.
If the Hubbell proposals are adopted, a thorough re-
view of manpower requirements will be required to define the
optimum force under the new structure. Until such a review
"
Modernizing Military Pay , Vol. I, Active Duty Compen-
sation , p. 150.

86
is completed, the long range cost implications of attaining
an optimum Naval force cannot be determined.
What the Hubbell Proposals Cannot Do for Retention
The heart of the Hubbell proposals is the assumption
there is a positive correlation between the magnitude of
military personnel shortages and the inadequacies of the pre-
sent military pay system. The Navy research studies on reten-
tion discussed in Chapter I lend validity to this assumption.
Therefore, the implication is that retention ills can be cured
by paying servicemen adequately via a credible and visible pay
system so that they know their pay is on a par with that of
civilians.
The thinking behind the Hubbell Plan is directly re-
lated to the "rational economic man" theory upon which Adam
Smith built his now partially discredited doctrine. The basis
for the theory is primarily supply and demand. The assumptions
that accompany it are: (1) man is primarily motivated by
economic incentives , and (2) since economic incentives are
controllable by management, man is a passive agent that can be
2
manipulated and motivated by the organization at will.
1
Edgar H. Shcein, Organizational Psychology (Englewood





This thinking is also related to the assumption in
McGregor's "Theory XM --that man is inherently lazy and must
therefore be motivated by outside incentives.
Department of Defense and Navy officials who believe
that the Hubbell proposals would solve all of the retention
problems are advocating these two theories. Fortunately, the
Navy is not placing complete reliance on the Hubbell Plan as
a solution to retention problems; its many career programs
attest to that. Indications are, however, that many Navy man-
agers expect more of an improvement than should be reasonably
expected. The Hubbell staff has discussed possible improve-
ments in retention of from 32 to 88 percent for enlisted per-
2
sonnel and 20 to 75 percent for officers. These figures seem
to indicate that compensation is either the only factor or by
far the most important factor in motivating men to choose a
Navy career.
Despite the assumptions and the supporting research,
the importance of pay as an incentive to motivate increased
retention is questionable. It appears that the complete
Douglas McGregor, The Humin Side of Enterprise (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1960), p. 15.




problem of the importance of pay in personnel administration
has not been dealt with. Wolf expressed it well when he said:
The essence of the problem of wage administration is that
wages are judged by so many criteria of fairness and jus-
tice that there is no one uniform standard for evaluating
them. Moreover, in our society wages are a socially
accepted subject of complaint, so that many less tangible
dissatisfactions may be expressed as complaints over wages.
Thus, we must recognize that wage administration at its
best may involve finding approximate solutions to insoluble
problems.
*
This analysis is applicable to the military as well as
civilian industry. It leads to an important question, "Is
pay dissatisfaction a major cause of poor retention or is it
merely masking the real but less tangible causes?"
Pay is only one factor in motivation. Therefore a
more valid motivational doctrine than the "rational economic
man" theory is the "self-actualizing man" theory supported
by such eminent scholars in the field as Argyris, McGregor
and Maslow. McGregor's contribution is his "Theory Y" which
implies that man is an organic system whose behavior is af-
fected not only by external forces (such as pay) but by
3intrinsic forces as well. Another part of the "self-
William B. Wolf, The Management of Personnel (San




Douglas McGregor, The Professional Manager, ed. by
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actualizing man" theory is Maslow's contention that man's
motives fall into classes which are arranged in a hierarchy:
(1) simple needs for survival, safety and security; (2) social
and affiliative needs; (3) ego-satisfaction and self-esteem
needs; (4) needs for autonomy and independence; and (5) self-
actualization needs . The implication is that extrinsic
rewards (such as pay) wil satisfy only the lower level needs
and, as these needs are satisfied, man will strive to satisfy
higher level needs with satisfaction being represented by
intrinsic (intangible) rewards.
Acceptance of this theory carries with it the realiza-
tion that pay plays a role only in the satisfaction of low
level security needs and that other needs must be dealt with
to attain total satisfaction. By relating this theory to re-
tention, the implication is that the Navy must compete with
private enterprise to satisfy monetary earning needs as well
as to satisfy the other needs in the hierarchy such as those
for ego-satisfaction and self-actualization.
Further evidence to support advocating this theory as
applicable to the Navy comes from Herzberg's work on the
Warren G. Bennis and Caroline McGregor (New York: McGraw-Hill





relationship between satisfaction and productivity. He found
that when employees feel they are fairly rewarded, increasing
the rewards further has only a modest effect on satisfaction.
The suggestion is that pay is highly important, but primarily
in a negative sense—when it is a "dissatisfier."
As discussed earlier, the present pay system is in-
adequate and works as a "dissatisfier" having a negative
influence on motivation and consequently retention. However,
doubts have been raised as to the validity of the assumption
that expressed complaints about pay are "in fact" genuine
complaints about pay and not other factors in the Navy environ-
ment.
In addition, it has been shown that pay is an important
factor in motivation (and consequently retention) only when
it is perceived as being inadequate by the recipients. It
follows then, that removal of pay as a "dissatisfier," removes
it as a retention issue.
Improving the military pay system by adopting the
Hubbell Plan would probably improve retention, but only to the
extent that pay is actually a retention issue and then only
Douglas McGregor, Leadership and Motivation , ed. by
Warren G. Bennis, Edgar H. Schein, and Caroline McGregor
(Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966), pp. 257-9.
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to the degree of its negative influence. If these factors are
great, improvement will be great; if it is modest, improvement
will be modest.
If the desired level of retention in the Navy is to
be realized there must be improvement in the administration of
extrinsic rewards (pay is but one) which are associated with
physiological needs. In addition, there must be improvement
in the nature of Naval environment that will allow men to ob-
tain the intrinsic rewards associated with high-level ego and
self-actualization needs.
In addition, the Navy must consider the possibility
that pay complaints are not pay complaints at all, but expres-
sions of dissatisfaction with some other element of naval life.
The Navy must identify and deal with the problem areas if
retention is to be improved considerably.
Improving the pay system would improve retention, but
since pay is only part of the retention issue, it can be only




The Navy's personnel retention problem is real. The
problem is not only the commonly understood one of insufficient
numbers, it is also one of insufficient quality in the career
force. The ever increasing role that our Navy plays in this
country's commitment to peace and freedom in the world has
made the problem more acute. To compound the problem, the
dynamic advancement of technology has and will continue to
place increase^ demands on the quantity and quality of our
naval forces. And yet, at a time when the retention of high
acitr.
calibre personnel is /vitally important^ te—the security of the
-free world, retention is declining.
The problem is caused by .poor personnel management and
a series of meaningless "stop-gap" measures to improve retention.
The only result of most of these actions has been to convince
servicemen that they are being treated unfairly. The plight
of the sailor is akin to that o^ the British soldier when
Rudyard Kipling wrote his poem "Tommy."




You talk o T better food for us, and schools, an'
fires, an 1 all:
We'll v/ait for extry rations if you treat us
rational
.
Don't mess about the cook-room slops, but prove
it to our face
The Widow's uniform is not the soldier-man's
disgrace.
For it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' "Chuck
him out, the brute!"
But it's "Savior of 'is country" when the guns
begin to shoot;
An' it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' anything
you please;





The problem is then "What does Tommy see?" If Tommy
were a sailor he would probably see a life of privation,
arduous duty, hazardous working conditions, family separations
and inadequate pay .
The Navy has been concerned with pay as a cause of in-
adequate retention for several years because most of the recent
surveys have indicated that pay is a major factor in motivating
a man to choose a Navy career. Finally, in 1965, the Congress,
the President and the Department of Defense recognized the
problem and directed a review of military pay--not only the
rates, but the concepts as well.
In the course of the review which became known as the
"Hubbell Study," it again became apparent that pay is a source
of dissatisfaction in the military and the cause of the problem
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is an outdated, confusing, complex and inequitable pay system.
A comparison between military and civilian pay showed that
military pay does / lag behind civilian pay.' Men are just not
willing to subject themselves to a life of hardship and suffer
an economic penalty as well. Pay then, is a cause of inade-
quate retention.
The Hubbell Plan was constructed to improve the pay
system with the expectation of improving retention. The Plan
focuses on improving the visibility of pay by converting to
a salary system, the credibility of pay through the application
of a quantitative standard and the equitability of pay by re-
moving all but longevity and pay grade criteria for determining
rates. In addition, the Hubbell proposals include improving
the retired pay system so that it compensates a man more realis-
tically in his post-military life.
It* addition to improving the pay system, the Hubbell
Plan recommends a pay raise that will bring military pay to
parity with Federal civilian pay. For most men, this increase
would mean an additional pay raise above the 12.6 percent
across-the-board increase that is law and will go into effect
if the Hubbell Plan is not enacted.
The Hubbell Plan is sound and it would definitely im-
prove the military compensation systenu There is little doubt
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that it would improve retention in the Navy.
;
While the direc-
tion of the influence is certain, the extent of the influence
is not
;
and would probably only be known several years after
implementation of the Plan.
There is an indication that Department of Defense and
Navy officials are putting too much emphasis on the Hubbell
Plan as a cure for retention ills. This paper has shown that
people often include pay as a source of dissatisfaction be-
cause "it's the thing to do." This implies that the surveys
showing pay as the major issue in retention might be distorted.
Even if pay is "in fact" the major issue in improving
retention, Maslow's "Hierarchy of Needs" theory is still ap-
plicable. Servicemen will not be completely satisfied until
they are given the opportunity to satisfy their high level
achievement needs. If these opportunities are not available,
retention will not appreciably improve.
Nevertheless, the Hubbell Plan would be a positive
step forward in improving retention because it will remove a
"dissatisfier." However, the Navy must take another look at
all aspects of the retention program. When "Tommy" sees that
pay is adequate, he will be looking higher on the "hierarchy"
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